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INTRODUCTION TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MEXICAN LAW: POLITICS OF MODERN NATIONALISM
EDWARD C. EPSTEIN*
Mexico's recently enacted legislation on investment and technol-
ogy' represents another step in that country's continued development
of modern nationalism. Though these laws announce some new prac-
tices in the regulation of foreign property and investment, they build
directly on earlier government policy and action. The result desired
from this evolving policy is an increase in the ability of the govern-
ment to control the future appearance of Mexico as a nation.
This paper will examine the two new laws in terms of their impli-
cations as to the state of present day Mexican nationalism. The term
"nationalism," here, means the common emotional commitment of
a large number of individuals to the symbols of an historical-cultural-
geographical abstraction called "the nation."2 In Mexico, of particu-
lar relevance are the nationalistic feelings of the dominant political
elite. Their attitudes have been strongly influenced by foreign con-
tact, whether through invasion, foreign investment, or tourism. Mexi-
can nationalism clearly reflects the nation's geographical proximity
to the United States. Many nationalists have long wanted to reduce
their dependence on capital and technology imported from across the
border to the north.
The present analysis falls into three parts. The first looks at the
historical evolution of government policy toward foreign investors
from the 1910 Revolution to the present. The second part is an over-
* ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLrICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH.
1. The complete titles of these two new laws are: Ley para promover la inversion
mexicana y regular la inversion extranjera (The Law to Promote Mexican Investment
and to Regulate Foreign Investment) [hereinafter referred to as Investment Law]; Ley
sobre el registro de la transferencia de tecnologia y el uso y explotacion de patentes y
marcas (Law on the Registry of Technological Transfer and the Use and Exploitation
of Patents and Trademarks) [hereinafter referred to as Technology Law].
2. See generally K. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION (1953).
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view of the contents of the two new laws, stressing those aspects
which could potentially be the cause of friction between foreigners
and the Mexican government. The final part focuses on President
Luis Echeverria's efforts to cope with the pressures for drastic change
which have been building up in Mexico in recent years. Through his
utilization of the issue of nationalism, Echeverria hopes to shift the
predominance of power in the government from the Right to the
Center of the political spectrum.
NATIONALISM: THE RECENT PAST
Today's nationalism reflects the past conflict between foreign
investors and the Mexican government. Sharp clashes between the
two have influenced both parties; each side was forced to re-evaluate
its past actions in terms of the outcome of those conflicts and in light
of a changing relationship of bargaining power.
Before the Constitution of 1917, investors clearly had the upper
hand. Their governments frequently intervened in Mexican politics
on their behalf to obtain and preserve the conditions most propitious
for the maximization of profits with minimal restriction on opera-
tions. Many investors were not particularly hesitant to exploit the
political and economic weaknesses of the Mexican government of the
day. Guided by classical liberal arguments about free trade and no-
tions of racial prejudice, they believed they had the right to invest
anywhere abroad. At first, Mexican officials grudingly accepted the
domination and political intervention on the part of the foreign inves-
tors. They did so because of a sense of political helplessness coupled
with naive positivist assumptions that automatic progress would re-
sult from foreign investment.
A growing level of frustration tended to coincide with the ex-
panding Mexican economy. At the same time, an increasing attitude
of confidence was produced by the new economic growth which pro-
vided the Mexican government with the resolve to challenge the for-
merly unquestioned dominance of the foreigners. Government actions
to restrict the activities of the investors caught the latter by surprise,
resulting in sharp conflicts between the two.
Further interaction between investors and the government was
dependent on the outcome of the initial conflict. Where the govern-
ment was able to impose restrictions on the investors, the latter grad-
ually reconciled themselves to accepting the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's right to set rules for future investment. As a result, the inves-
tors attempted merely to keep the changes to a minimum by applying
the only pressure available to them-threats to withdraw or withhold
funds from Mexican investment. An atmosphere of mutual bargain-
ing developed as the growing strength and confidence of the Mexican
government asserted itself against the power of the foreign investors.
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The evolution of this nationalism was not a uniform progression.3
Early governments were unable to make more than symbolic protests
against the domination of Mexican resources by foreigners. Although
Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution reasserted the State's traditional
monopoly of subsoil ownership rights,4 in the face of U.S. threats of
military invasion and the withholding of diplomatic recognition,
nothing was done to repossess mining and petroleum properties ille-
gally deeded to foreign companies during the Diaz period. 5 Similarly,
other provisions of the same Article existed only on paper, such as the
right to expropriate private property with compensation and the right
to forbid foreign land holdings in border and littoral areas. The acts
of intervention of U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson in 1913 and
the sending of American naval and land forces into Mexico as in the
1914 Vera Cruz landing or the 1916-17 Pershing expedition remained
a vivid memory of the power of the United States.7 Thus, not until
the government of Lazaro Cardenas in 1938 was there any serious
interference with the economic activities of foreign businessmen.
The assertion of a strong nationalist position by the Cardenas
government toward foreign-owned petroleum forced outside investors
to re-examine their assumptions about the Mexican government's
ability to limit foreign property rights. Faced with a direct challenge
to his government by the oil companies which refused to recognize
Mexican labor law, Cardenas reacted by expropriating their proper-
ties. The Mexican position in the open conflict which resulted was
strengthened by the likely prospect of World War II. In its desire to
avoid a repeat of the World War I situation of bad relations, the
United States hesitated to exert the type of pressure which would
have normally been expected.' An arrangement for compensation was
agreed upon during the government of Manuel Avila Camacho, Car-
denas' successor. The successful expropriation of petroleum finally
established that foreign investors, indeed, were to be subject to Mexi-
can law.
By the mid-1950's, Mexico had created a modus vivendi with
foreign investors. Disputes over financial compensation due foreign-
3. Particular presidents were specially responsible for winning Mexico more con-
trol over its resources, while others like Miguel Aleman and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz were
either uninterested or temporarily reversed the process.
4. See THE CONSTrrUIONS OF THE AMERICAS 505-13 (R. Fitzgibbon ed. 1948).
5. G. MAUR, NATIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 78 (1966). For a more detailed picture
of this period see R.F. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES AND REVOLUTIONARY NATIONALISM IN
MEXICO, 1916-1932 (1972).
6. CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 4, at 505-13.
7. J. FAGG, LATIN AMERICA: A GENERAL HISTORY 536, 538 (1969); SMITH, supra note
5, at 43-70.
8. SMITH, supra note 5, at 96.
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ers from the 1910-1917 revolutionary period had long since been set-
tled. Foreign capital was now flowing back into Mexico at a rate
unprecedented in Mexican history. These new investors were not
frightened by the government regulations reserving certain aspects of
the Mexican economy to Mexicans only.' When problems arose dur-
ing this time concerning the operation of the foreign-dominated
power industry, negotiations finalized in 1960 provided for the Mexi-
can purchase of the industry, a settlement quite acceptable to the
foreign owners.10 The purchase of U.S. owned copper and sulfur prop-
erties and of majority ownership of the telephone system in 19721,
only marked a continuation of the now well established Mexican
government policy that basic industries such as petroleum, minerals,
communications and steel ought to be owned by Mexican nationals
and not foreigners.
The 1973 foreign investment law really says very little which was
new in terms of Mexican government policy. For example, in 1963,
an official Mexican publication aimed at foreign investors stated:
Foreign private investment is well received when it does not displace
Mexican capital, when it associates on a minority basis with local inves-
tors, devotes itself to increasing the country's productivity, and does not
attempt to obtain privileges or preference.12
Though not radically new, the 1973 law serves a purpose; it is written
to be specific and enforceable. The Echeverria government in 1972
clearly felt that the somewhat vague, voluntaristic approach of its
predecessors needed some tightening-up in order that abuses such as
the increasing number of purchases of established Mexican enter-
prises by foreigners be stemmed.
The nationalist fears in Mexico in the early 1970's of a foreign
take-over of the most profitable sectors of Mexican industry received
widespread publicity. One article claimed that in 1970 foreign invest-
ment in manufacturing controlled 84 percent of the tobacco industry,
78 percent of chemicals, 68 percent of metal products, 54 percent of
non-metallic mineral products, 60.5 percent of diverse manufacturing
products, and 33 percent of paper and paper products. 3 Article 8 of
the investment law which gives preference to Mexican investors in
9. See BANCO NATIONAL DE COMERcIo EXTERIOR, MEXICO 181-182, (1966); M.
WIONCZEK, INVERSION Y TECNOLOGIA EXTRANTERA EN AMERICA LATINA 145-146 (1971);
M. B=TETA, Mexican Government Policy Towards Foreign Investors, in FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 265-272 (M. Bernstein ed. 1966).
10. See generally M. WIONCZEK, Electric Power: The Uneasy Partnership, in
PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN MEXICO 19 (R. Vernon ed. 1964).
11. Siempre, Dec. 6, 1972, at 13.
12. BANCO NATIONAL DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR, MEXICO 288 (1963).
13. E. Mujica, Por fin: la ley esperada, Siempre, Jan. 10, 1973, at 30, quoting
figures from a study by economist C. Bazdresch.
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company purchases is clearly aimed at limiting, if not preventing, the
continued de-nationalization of Mexican industry.
The new laws deal with another problem area facing the Echev-
erria government-the continued deficit in Mexico's balance of pay-
ments. Some writers suggested that the process of import-
substitution industrialization upon which so many hopes were resting
was actually increasing pressure on the balance of payments by re-
quiring a steady stream of imported parts and technology from
abroad, all of which had to be paid for with "hard" currency. The
anticipated exports to the world market have been very slow in com-
ing. Between 1956 and 1966, as foreign investment continued to
increase in Mexico, the extent of sales abroad of United States in-
dustrial subsidies operating in Mexico rose from one and one-half
percent of total sales to only thirteen percent, most of which were in
auto exports.' 5 Nor has the export of manufactured products from
new plants installed just inside the Mexican border in the late 1960's
had much effect on the balance of payments, since most exports are
merely assembled in Mexico using parts directly imported from the
United States.
The 1972 technology law was aimed at reducing the balance of
payments pressure by controlling the imports of costly technology,
much of which may not really make a major contribution to Mexican
know-how. According to one 1969 study of U.S. subsidiaries operating
in Mexico, almost half the respondents admitted that export prohibi-
tions had been imposed upon them by their home offices.' Article 7,
Fraction 7 of the new law bans this practice of forbidding industries
operating in Mexico from exporting abroad. The heavy spending of
Mexican industry on imported technology has contributed to Mex-
ico's growing foreign debt and in many cases has done nothing to
facilitate the exports needed to pay the costs. 7
Taken together, the technology and the investment laws fit well
into the pattern just described of an emerging Mexican nationalism.
The laws are the logical continuation of a series of government poli-
cies intended to give Mexican officials more control over their econ-
omy. To determine their potential impact, it is necessary to study
14. WIONCZEK, supra note 9, at 31-33.
15. Id. at 153. Non-auto exports in 1966 were only three percent of total sales of
U.S. subsidiaries in Mexico.
16. The study referred to by the National Chamber Foundation of Washington,
D.C. is cited in WIONCZEK, supra note 9, at 163.
17. For a study of Mexico and other Latin American countries' serious foreign
debt problem see M. WIONCZEK, El endeudamiento publico externo y los cambios
sectorales en la inversion privada extranjera de America Latina, in LA DEPENDENCLA
POLMCo-EcoNOMICA DE AMERICA LATrNA 111-145 (H. Jaguaribe ed. 1971).
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them in greater detail.
THE LEGISLATION OF 1972-73
In late 1972, the two laws were sent to the Mexican Congress by
President Echeverria. Both bills were passed and signed into law
without major modification of the presidential drafts. 8 The contents
of each will be described separately.
The law on technology establishes a National Registry for the
Transference of Technology within the Ministry of Industry and
Commerce. 9 All contracts or agreements concerning the transference
and use of technology, patents and trademarks must be filed with the
Registry within 60 days in order to be legally binding.20 Typically
such contracts involve either foreigners or foreign owned businesses,
since most of Mexico's technology is imported from abroad and a
large part of its trademarks and patents are foreign owned.
While the registration requirements are not particularly contro-
versial, the extensive contract limitations presented by Article 7 of
the law might appear more subject to debate. Article 7 lists fourteen
instances under which contract approval will normally be denied.'
18. Hispanoamericano, Feb. 26, 1973, at 8; Siempre, Dec. 6, 1972, at 13; Siempre,
Jan. 10, 1973, at 6.
19. Technology Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
20. Id., arts. 2,4,6.
21. Id., art. 7. These fourteen instances include:
1. When the object is the transference of technology freely available in
the country... ;
2. When the price has no relation to [the value of] the technology
acquired or constitutes an unjustifiable and excessive burden on the na-
tional economy;
3. When clauses are included which permit the purveyor to regulate or
intervene in, directly or indirectly, the business of the technology's ac-
quirer;
4. When the obligation is established to cede for little or nothing to the
purveyor of the technology the patents, trademarks, innovations, or im-
provements that are obtained by the acquirer;
5. When limits are imposed on research or technical development (of
the technology) by the acquirer;
6. When the obligation is established to acquire equipment, tools, parts,
or raw material exclusively from one specified source;
7. When the export of the goods or services produced by the acquirer are
prohibited in a manner contrary to the interest of the country;
8. When the use of complementary technology is prohibited;
9. When the obligation is established to sell exclusively to the purveyor
of the technology the goods produced by the acquirer;
10. When the acquirer is obliged permanently to use personnel indi-
cated by the purveyor of the technology;
11. When the volume of production is limited or prices for sale or resale
are imposed on national production or on the exports of the acquirer;
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Since many of the practices mentioned in the fourteen points have
commonly been incorporated in contracts for the acquisition of for-
eign technology, the new law serves as formal notice that the Mexican
government finds such practices harmful to its goal of rapid in-
dustrial development. The harshness of the new law is considerably
diluted, however, by an important escape clause. Under a number of
the fourteen points, exceptions can be made where the technology to
be acquired is "of particular interest to the country. ' ' 2 In other words,
the distasteful aspects of some contracts will be ignored when the
technology to be gained outweighs the disadvantages of retaining
such contracts. The law, therefore, is nationalistic, but flexible.
The second piece of legislation, the investment law, seeks to
restrict foreign ownership and control over the Mexican economy by
formalizing certain established government policies which have re-
served parts of the economy for state control while leaving other parts
to wholly Mexican-owned private enterprises.2 3 Moreover, in those
areas where foreign investment is allowed, the percentage of foreign
capital invested is to be limited. For mining concessions, foreign capi-
tal investment may not exceed forty-nine percent of any single busi-
ness. Henceforth, no mining concessions may be transferred directly
to foreigners. 24 For firms dealing with the secondary products of the
petrochemical industry and those engaged in the manufacture of au-
tomobile parts, capital investment by foreigners is limited to forty
percent. Where no specific limit is indicated in the law or by execu-
tive regulatory dispositions, an upper limit of forty-nine percent is to
be understood. Although the law is not clear, these restrictions seem-
ingly apply only to new investments and to businesses presently in
Mexican possession.
Similar to the law on technology, the investment law has appro-
priate escape clauses in order to provide for regulatory flexibility.
Where foreign investment is "advantageous for the Mexican econ-
omy," the normal limit of forty-nine percent may be altered.2
One of the special problem areas the investment law is designed
12. When the acquirer is obliged to sign exclusive sales or representation
contracts with the purveyor of the technology within national territory;
13. When the contracts are for an excessive period. In no case can the
time period exceed ten years for the acquirer; or
14. When knowledge of the resolution of legal judgments originating out
of the interpretation or fulfillment of the said acts, agreements, or con-
tracts (must be) submitted to foreign courts.
22. Id., art. 8. Such exception will be made for points 2,3,6 and 8-12.
23. Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
24. Id., art. 5, fraction a.
25. Id., art. 5.
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to control concerns the situation in which Mexican companies are
induced to sell out to foreign investors. In recent years, an ever in-
creasing share of foreign money in Mexico has gone toward the pur-
chase of existing local firms, rather than the establishment of new
ones. In a survey of the subsidiaries of the largest U.S. companies
established in Mexico from 1958 to 1967, it was discovered that 61
percent were acquired from prior Mexican owners, whereas only 39
percent were newly organized.2 1 The Mexican government now hopes
to control this practice in the future by requiring special authoriza-
tion whenever foreigners acquire more than 25 percent of the capital
or more than 49 percent of the fixed assets of the particular Mexican
company.
27
The above provisions of the investment law are to be supervised
by a National Commission for Foreign Investments, comprised of the
heads of seven key government ministries. 28 This commission is to be
aided in its decisions on granting exemptions under the law by seven-
teen guidelines. These include consideration of the effects of foreign
investment on the Mexican balance of payments and Mexico's ability
to export, the effect on employment and salaries, the use of Mexican-
made parts and Mexican technology.
2 9
To ensure that the provisions of the investment law are enforced,
all shares in Mexican enterprises held by foreigners must be con-
verted into registered shares (titulos nominativos) whereas pre-
viously, no such registration was necessary. 0 Furthermore, all foreign
investments must be registered with the National Registry for For-
eign Investments, a dependency of the Ministry of Industry and Com-
merce, under the authority of the Executive Secretary of the National
Commission for Foreign Investments.31 Failure to register denies the
non-complying company the right to pay dividends.2 Fines up to
100,000 pesos may be levied against violating company officers and
directors who may be held personally liable.3 Further, any individual
who permits foreigners to enjoy the rights of investment reserved to
Mexican citizens will be subject to fines of up to 50,000 pesos and a
26. J. VAUPEL & J. CURHAN, THE MAKING OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 300-301
(1969). The percentages are a radical increase from the 1948-1957 period when the
percentages for acquired and new subsidiaries were thirty-nine and sixty-one respec-
tively, exactly the reverse of the decade to come.
27. Investment Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
28. Id., art. 11.
29. For the complete set of guidelines see id., art. 13.
30. Id., art. 25.
31. Id., arts. 23,24.
32. Id., art. 27.
33. Id., arts. 28, 29.
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prison sentence of up to nine years. 34 This last provision is designed
to eliminate the so-called prestanombres (strawmen), Mexican citi-
zens who have lent their names to foreigners so that the latter could
invest in and control areas of the Mexican economy otherwise forbid-
den to foreign citizens.
In short, the laws represent a formal legal response to the steadily
increasing call for the control of imported funds and technology by
Mexican nationalists. While they may be seen as a response by the
government to economic pressures, political pressures may really be
much more important as the next section will show.
ECHEVERRIA AND THE MEXICAN POLITICAL CRISIS
In recent years, Mexican politics has been characterized by its
apparent stability. A series of presidents have each peacefully served
out their term. This surface calm was shattered, however, in October
1968, by the Tlatelolco massacre, and again in June 1971 by the
Falcons incident (Las Halcones). 35 Each of these events caused a
major crisis in the Mexican government.
Tlatelolco and the Falcons incident were symptomatic of how the
administrations of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) and Luis Echever-
ria responded to increasing social tensions. An analysis of these two
incidents will aid in understanding the reasons for the passage of the
new legislation of 1972-73.
During the presidency of Diaz Ordaz, political power in Mexico
had shifted to the Right. Echeverria, on the other hand, has sought
to shift more toward the Center. It appears that Echeverria has
sought to accomplish this shift partially through the new legislation
previously discussed. By re-emphasizing nationalism, he hopes to
attract the political support of those of the left of the regime whose
aid will be needed to oust the well-entrenched conservative forces left
over from his predecessor's government.
Most authors agree that Mexican politics has been dominated in
recent years by strong presidents who have presided over coalitions
of usually subordinate personality and interest groups. 31 Significant
crises are likely to occur only when important groups, either within
or outside the governing elite, directly challenge government policies.
34. Id., art. 31.
35. For descriptions of these events see C. FUENTES, TIEMPO MEXICANO 147-172
(1971); K. JOHNSON, MEXICAN DEMOCRACY: A CRITICAL VIEW 148-164 (1971); M. TmRADO,
EL 10 DE JUN1O Y LA IZQUIERDA RADICAL 16-39, 118-128, 178-181 (1971).
36. See F. BRANDENBURG, THE MAKING OF MODERN MEXICO 2-7 (1964); P. GONZALES
CASANOVA, LA DEMOCRACIA EN MEXICO 26-31 (1967); R. HANSEN, LA POLITICA DEL DESAR-
ROLLO MEXICANO 170-171 (1971); JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 59-76; R. SCOTT, MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITION 259 (1959).
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The incidents of 1968 and 1971 were confrontations of this sort. To
explain these events and the attempts to deal with them, it is neces-
sary to first look at the division of power within Mexico in the late
1960's and early 1970's.
Brandenburg suggests that this division of power consists of




3) Revolutionary [or governmental] Left
4) Revolutionary [or governmental] Center
5) Revolutionary [or governmental] Right
6) Traditional Conservatives
7) Reactionary Conservatives
Of these seven, only the members of the so-called "Revolutionary
Publics" (groups 3-5) have exercised power in Mexico since the end
of the violent stage of the Revolution in 1917. These three are the key
groups which may or may not have support from the actors on one of
the extremes. Brandenburg believes that the Center has usually been
best represented in the presidency, but that on specific occasions,
power has swung to one of the other "Revolutionary" groups. Presi-
dent Cardenas (1934-40) has been the only representative of the Rev-
olutionary Left, while Presidents Aleman (1946-52) and Diaz Ordaz
have represented the Revolutionary Right.
3 8
The governments of the Revolutionary Center and Right have
generally agreed on government policies favoring big agriculture over
the peasant (ejido) sector, urban over rural interests and, in general,
the more affluent over the less affluent.39 As a result, the distribution
of income in Mexico has become steadily more inequitable. While
these inequities have been protested by radical students and dissi-
dent trade union leaders, for the most part, the protests have either
been ignored or repressed by government officials. One such repres-
sion was the Tlatelolco massacre.
This particular incident arose from a situation of increasing stu-
dent militancy confronted by brutal government armed repression.
The government of President Diaz Ordaz was closely identified with
the Revolutionary Right and its allies among many major business-
37. BRANDENBURG, supra note 36, at 119.
38. Id. at 131-140.
39. I.M. de Navarrete, Income Distribution in Mexico, in MExIco's RECENT Eco-
NOMic GROWTH: THE MEXICAN VIEW 133-172 (T. Davis ed. 1967). A major critique of
the situation of the Mexican peasantry is presented in Stavenhagen, Social Aspects of
Agrarian Structure in Mexico, in AGRARIAN PROBLEMS AND PEASANT MOVEMENTS IN
LATIN AMERICA 225-270 (R. Stavenhagen ed. 1970).
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men operating in Mexico. The street demonstrations organized by the
students in Mexico City just prior to the 1968 Olympic Games repre-
sented to the Right (especially the Monterrey Group of industrial-
ists)40 an intolerable challenge. The government responded with an
armed attack on the students."
After Tlatelolco, the criticism of the political system, which had
begun in 1965 by Carlos Madrazo and others,4" reached major propor-
tions. The so-called "Mexican miracle" of sustained economic growth
was widely condemned on the Left as hollow and superficial. The
gross national product had indeed increased steadily, but critics be-
lieved that the beneficiaries were those who least needed to benefit.
This rising tide of criticism from various groups both within and
outside of the "Revolutionary Publics '43 was to have a major impact
on Diaz Orda-'s successor, Luis Echeverria.
Once in office, Echeverria was faced with a choice between fur-
ther repression or a new democratization." His so-called "democratic
opening" was a response in favor of the latter." Instead of Diaz
Ordaz's almost exclusive concern with new investments and G.N.P.
growth per se, Echeverria began speaking of the need to redistribute
income as a means of promoting both social justice and a larger
domestic market.4 6 He was highly critical of foreign investors who
sought only profit repatriation, while ignoring the need for a constant
reinvestment of profits and increase in Mexican exports.47
The critical speeches of the new President aroused a great deal
of anxiety among Mexican conservatives and their foreign allies who
saw their position in Mexico in danger. They were even more upset
by the President's intervention at the end of May 1971 in a university
dispute in Monterrey, a major center of conservative political and
economic control, which resulted in the ouster of both the university
rector and the governor who had appointed and supported him
against the students."
The response of the conservatives was to instigate an attack by
40. For a discussion of the "Monterrey Group" see JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 76.
41. Id. at 159-161; Latin America, Oct. 11, 1968, at 325-326.
42. JOHNSON, supra note 35, at 45-47.
43. See E. PADILLA ARAGON, MEXICO: DESARROLLO CON POBREZA (1969); F.
CARMONA, EL MILAGRO MEXlCANO (1970); M. MORENO SANCHEZ, CRISIS POLITICA DE
MExIco (1970); R. STAVENHAGEN, NEOLATIFUNDISIMO Y EXPLOTACION (1968).
44. FUENTES, supra note 35, at 162.
45. See Latin America, Jan. 29, 1971, at 34,36.
46. BANCO NATIONAL DE COMERCiO EXTERIOR, MEXICO: LA POLITICA ECONOMICA DEL
NUEVO GOBIERNO 16-18 (1971).
47. Id. at 190-191.
48. Latin America, June 11, 1971, at 189-190.
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bands of armed thugs called Falcons on a group of student demon-
strators in Mexico City, while police officials stood by passively. The
reaction of the Left to the Falcons' attack was as strong as that after
Tlatelolco in 1968. Clearly, the President was faced with the need to
take strong measures against those responsible if he was to preserve
his new-found support on the Left. Such action, on the other hand,
might threaten the political structure, because any attempt to punish
the powerful economic personages of the Right could provoke wide-
spread political struggle.
Echeverria acted cautiously. After demonstrating that he had
the strong backing of the Mexican military, which stationed tanks at
strategic locations in the Federal District, he forced the resignations
of the Regent of Mexico City and the Chief of Police. Echeverria's
next move was to defuse the immediate crisis by calling for what was
sure to be a protracted investigation of the whole affair.49 This inter-
val could be used by the President to rally support for himself and
to strengthen his political base.
The new laws of 1972 and 1973 ought to be seen as part of this
attempt to Echeverria to strengthen his political base. The issue of
nationalism is highly suited to appeal to those to the left of the
President, while it puts the Right on the defensive. Mexican investors
and industrialists, with their foreign allies, will find it difficult to
attack the President openly without leaving themselves vulnerable to
charges of putting foreign interests ahead of those of their own nation.
The political offensive by Echeverria and his supporters to pass
the new legislation began in October 1972, just prior to the Seventh
National Assembly of the government party, the PRI. In a speech
delivered at the Fundo de Cultura Economica on October 18, the day
before the Assembly opening, the President himself spoke of the great
pressure on Mexican companies to sell out to foreigners.50 At the
Assembly, Lic. Jesus Reyes Heroles, the new president of the PRI
Executive Committee, called for a law to permit the government to
regulate foreign and private investment. 5' The Program for Action,
produced by the Assembly as a PRI policy statement, repeated the
call for such a law.52 The theme switched on October 30, when Lic.
Rodolfo Echeverria Ruiz, another high PRI official, condemned the
importation of obsolete technology from abroad which inflated Mexi-
can production costs.53 Four days later, the President sent the tech-
49. Id. at 193-194, 196, 205-207.
50. Siempre, Dec. 6, 1972, at 13.
51. Hispanoamericano, Oct. 30, 1972, at 14.
52. Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 10.
53. Hispanoamericano, Oct. 30, 1972, at 14.
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nology bill to Congress where it received rapid approval by the PRI
majorities in both houses. About the same time, the notable sympa-
thetic magazine Siempre, itself a voice of the Revolutionary Left,
contained a number of articles and editorials urging the passage of
the technology bill and what was to be the investment bill.
5 4
The passage of the new laws at that time was a direct result of
the governmental crisis in Mexico, first apparent at Tlatelolco and
intensified by the Falcons incident. While the crisis may have been
disturbing to those who had imagined Mexico as a land of political
stability, it also had its positive side. It gained for the beleaguered
government the support of a number of prominent figures on the Left
(such as Carlos Fuentes who had been highly critical of Echeverria's
predecessor, Diaz Ordaz) and, indeed, support of much of the Mexi-
can political rystem. 5
The laws, themselves, offer the opportunity for the Mexican gov-
ernment to continue to extend its control over various parts of the
national economy in its professed desire to promote development
with social justice. Such control seems both logical and necessary as
Mexican nationalism evolves.
With their various escape clauses, the laws will require the neces-
sary government resolve if they are to attain their desired ends. Be-
cause the forces opposed to the implementation of the laws are still
strong in parts of the government bureaucracy, such implementation
cannot be assumed as a matter of fact. As one writer has suggested
in speaking of Latin America as a whole:
[It] is well known that in Latin America . . .many problems related to
foreign investment are resolved in a casuistic and administrative way,
outside of existing law, and in agreement with the "power of persuasion"
of the large transnational investors.m
Those political analysts who are optimists will see the laws of
1972-73 as a sign that the Echeverria Presidency really is serious
about its desire to change the priorities of Mexican development. On
the other hand, the cynics will probably view the new legislation as
little more than an exercise in the "symbolic uses of politics." 57 We,
the observers, must wait to see.
54. H. Castilla, Aparecen Cartas Marcadas, al Cambian Las Reglas del Juego,
Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 24; Editorial, Una Ley que Regula la Inversion Extranjera,
Siempre, Oct. 18, 1972, at 16-17; Mujica, En la Battalla Para Ajustar la Tecnologia
Extranjera, Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 28-29; Mujica, Por Fin: La Ley Esperada,
Siempre, Jan. 10, 1973, at 30-31; Martinez de la Vega, Cambien Ciertas Reglas Pero
No El Juego, Siempre, Nov. 1, 1972, at 26-27.
55. See FUENTES, supra note 35 at 162-172; also Fuentes, El Extremismo de
Algunos Jovenes Descencantados, in TmAno, supra note 35, at 118-122.
56. WIONCZEK, supra note 9, at 97.
57. See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
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